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"lPERSONAL BAGGAGE" AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In McIntosh v. Augusta & A. Ry. Co., 69 S. E., 159, the
plaintiff had been refused admittance to a street car because he
was carrying a five-cent piece of ice, the conductor claiming that
the ice was not properly packed, so as to prevent leakage, and that
he was acting under the authority of a rule of the defendant com-
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pany, which forbade passengers to carry bulky and dangerous
packages aboard the cars. It has been proven on trial that the
ice was so packed as to prevent leakage, and the Court decided
that as a matter of law, it could not say that ice. was not personal
baggage.
As to the amount and nature of goods that may be carried
as personal baggage some very interesting questions have arisen
for settlement by the courts. In Connolly v. Warren, 1o6 Mass.,
146, it was held that a feather bed was not personal baggage,
inasmuch as it was not appropriate nor necessary for the personal
use of one while travelling. In Little Rack & Hot Springs West-
ern Railway Co. v. Record, 74 Ark., 125, it was held that 
two
shot-guns were personal baggage, as they were carried by 
the
traveller on a hunting trip.
Jones v. Vorhees, io Ohio, i4o, decided that inasmuch as stage
coaches were common carriers, a watch left in a trunk was 
part of
a traveller's personal baggage and that they were liable therefor.
It is generally held, however, in deciding what is to be con-
sidered personal baggage and what is not, that it is a matter 
for
the jury and not for the court to pass judgment on. When 
the
duty falls upon the jury to decide as to what shall and shall 
not
be classified as personal baggage, the question which presents
itself is what circumstances shall the jury consider when 
so
deliberating. Morris v. Bay State Steamboat, 4 Bosw., 
225, in
holding that it was a question of fact for the jury to decide 
what
personal baggage was, also added that, in so deciding, the 
resi-
dence of the passenger should be taken into consideration.
Little Rock & Hot Springs Western Railway Co. v. Record,
74 Ark., 125, held personal baggage to be whatever a passenger
took with him for his personal use and convenience, based 
upon
the wants of the particular class to which he belongs, either 
with
reference to the immediate necessities, or to the purposes 
of the
journey. Consequently, it would seem that there are 
four
requisites for the jury to consider, which may be classed 
as fol-
lows: the passenger's residence; his station in life; the 
purpose
of the journey; and the necessities required for such 
a journey.
In McIntosh v. Augusta & A. Ry. Co., 69 S. E. Rep., 159, the
case at hand, it seems that the learned judge has taken upon
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himself to lay down a matter of fact as a rule of law, and his
action is almost without precedent. His position may be justified,
however, as circumstances often alter cases. For in this case the
ice was for a sick man. In times of sickness certain articles are
very necessary and it is often most urgent that they should be
speedily procured, and ice is often as much of a necessity as medi-
cine. Considering ice as a necessity in the present case, the next
question is, can it be classified under any one of the four
requisites above mentioned. It seems possible to consider it as
coming under the head of the purpose of the journey.
The utmost expedition was required in the plaintiff's mission
and the article required was ice, consequently the whole question
was dependent upon circumstances, and it was undoubtedly in
this light that the court so regarded it.
It seems proper under these circumstances to classify ice as
personal baggage, considering it as a necessity and inherent in
the very purpose of the journey. However, it is not always de-
sirable to establish precedents, for this question could have as
easily been decided by jury and would undoubtedly have gained
more favor. For the true rule seems to be. as laid down and
emphasized most decisively in Brook v. Gale, I4 Fla., 523, that it
is improper for a judge to decide what personal baggage is, be-
cause it is a question of fact and should be left to the jury.
STATUTORY LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS ON THE REORGANIZATION
OF A CORPORATION.
In the reorganization of an Ohio railroad company, the new
company assumed the debts of the. old, and provided for an issue
of first-lien bonds to be sold, and the proceeds.to be used to pay
such indebtedness. Under the statute of the state, the stock-
holders were subject to double liability, but such bonds contained
a provision by which the holders waived the right to resort to
such liability in consideration of the lien given. It was held in
Irvine v. Baulcard, 181 Fed., 206, that a stockholder of the old
company who became a party to the reorganization and ex-
changed his stock for stock in the new company was subject to
the additional liability for the debts of the old company so far
as they were not discharged from the proceeds of the bonds sold.
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"The term reorganization has no very definite meaning in th
law of corporations, but is applied indifferently to various pro-
ceedings and transactions by which succession of corporations is
brought about, and also to proceedings by which existing corpora-
tions are continued under a different organization without the
creation of a new corporation." Marshall on Private Corpora-
tions, p. 455.
The general rule is that a new corporation organized to succeed
the old corporation is not liable for the debts of the latter
Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & Miss. Railway Co., 142 U. S., 396
The new corporation will be responsible for the debts of the old
however,.where (i) circumstances are such as to warrant the con
clusion that the new corporation is not a separate and distinct
corporation, but merely a continuation of the old corporation anc
hence the same person in law. Benesh v. Mill Owners' Mutua
Fire Insurance Co. of Iowa, io3 Ia., 465, or (2) where it has it
express terms or by reasonable implication assumed the debts o
the old corporation. Fernschild v. Yuengling Brewing Co., 15,
N. Y., 667.
It is well settled that stockholders of a corporation are no-
personally liable for debts of the corporation, either at law or ir
equity, unless such liability is expressly imposed by the charter,
or by some statutory or constitutional provision. Salt Lake City
National Bank v. Hendrickson, 40 N. J. L., 52. "The reason is
that a corporation is a legal entity or artificial person distinct
from the members who compose it, in their individual capacity,
and when it contracts a debt, it is the debt of this legal entity
or artificial person-the corporation-and not the debt of the
individual members. Marshall on Private Corporations, p. Io.
Sometimes a constitutional or statutory provision declares that
stockholders shall be individually liable to creditors of the cor-
poration to the amount due on their stock. Paterson v. Lynde,
112 Ill., 196.
As a general rule the liability so imposed on stockholders is
neither limited to the amount due on their stock, nor unlimited,
but is for an amount equal to the nominal or par value of their
stock, in addition to what they may have paid, or may be
due thereon. It imposes in effect a "double liability." Root v.
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Sinnock, i2o Ill., 196; Willis v. E. L. Mabon et at., 48 Minn.,
14o. The liability of stockholders under some state statutes for
debts of the corporation "in double the amount of the par value
of the stock owned by them respectively" is double the amount
of such value in addition to their liability to the corporation on
their original subscription. Zang et al. v. Wyant et al., 25 Col.,
551. Moreover, the individual liability, equally and ratably, of
stockholders under the charter will not be increased by the in-
solvency of other stockholders, or the fact that some of them are
beyond the reach of process. Maine Trust & Banking Co. v.
Southern Loan & Trust Co., 92 Me., 444.
As to the liability of stockholders in a reorganized corporation,
if any stockholder of the old corporation refuses to come into the
reorganization agreement, he cannot be compelled to do so. He
may insist on his rights as a stockholder and prevent any re-
orgafiization which will affect the rights secured to him by his
contract with the company. Hollister v. Stewart, ii i N. Y., 644;
Lake St. El. v. Ziegler, 99 Fed., 114. Any party, however,
whether a stockholder, bondholder or other creditor, or the cor-
poration itself, who enters into a valid agreement for the pur-
pose of reorganization, is bound thereby and cannot repudiate
the same and insist upon his original rights in violation of its
terms, either before or after the agreement has been carried out.
Dester v. Ross, 85 Mich., 370; First Nat'l Bank of Chattanooga
v. Radford Trust Co., 8o Fed., 569. But an agreement for re-
organization like any other contract, is not binding unless the
promises of the parties are supported by a consideration. Provi-
dence Albertype Co. v. Kent & Stanley Co., 19 R. I., 561.
In the case at hand the defendant by assenting to the re-
organization agreement, became as much bound by it as if he had
signed it and he became a stockholder of the reorganized com-
pany and as such became subject to the liability imposed by the
Ohio statute.
So, although ordinarily a stockholder is not liable for the
debts of a corporation in the absence of statutory or charter
provisions making him so, and although a reorganized corpora-
tion is not for that reason alone liable for the debts of the old
corporation, yet a stockholder who joins a reorganization agree-
ment, whereby the reorganized corporation assumes the debts of
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the old corporation. becomes liable for the debts of the corpor.
tion under a statute imposing a double liability upon stockholder
PRIVY EXAMINATION OF MARRIED WOMAN BY TELEPHONE AS T('
TIER EXECUTION OF A DEED.
Very few adjudicated cases are to be found in the books upon
this exact point because of the fact that certificates of acknowl-
edgement are usually conclusive of the facts contained therein.
The acknowledgement is no part of the deed itself and the
certificate is sufficiefit if it shows that the requirements of the
statute have been in substance complied with. Burbank v. Ellis,
7 Neb., 156, 164. And the failure of the notary to make a
proper certificate of acknowledgement will not invalidate the
deed. Linderman v. Axford, 56 N. Y. Supp., 456. It has refer-
ence to the proof of the execution, not to the force of the deed
itself, especially where third parties are concerned. Murray v.
Beal, 65 Pac. (Utah), 726. What constitutes an acknowledge-
ment is well defined in Steers v. Kinsey, 68 Ark., 36o.
In a recent case, Wester v. Hurt, 13o S. W. (Tenn.), 842, the
wife had joined with her husband in a deed of trust of her land
to secure the debts of their son. In an effort to avoid the en-
forcement of the deed, it was proved that the privy examination
of the wife, as required by statute, had been taken by the notary
over a telephone. The court held that this was not a compliance
with the statute, and that the deed was therefore void.
Opposed to this decision is the case of Banning v. Banning,
8o Cal., 271. This was an action for the partition of land. At
the time of the making and acknowledging the deed, the defendant
was a married woman and her acknowledgement was taken by a
notary through a telephone while she was three miles away. It
was contended that the woman not being visibly present and
therefore not personally present before the notary at the time,
that the deed had not been executed and therefore the plaintiff
could claim no title. But the court declared that in the absence
of fraud, accident, duress, or mistake, the certificate of the notary
in due form of law is conclusive of the material facts thert.a
stated.
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The position of the court in this case seems to be supported by
the weight of authority. In Baldwin v. Snowden, ii Ohio St.,
2o3, the court held that a regular statutory certificate of the
acknowledgement of a deed of conveyance, made by a husband
and wife, is, in the absence of fraud, conclusive evidence of the
facts stated therein. In a Nebraska case, Smith and Smith were
partners in business and secured their accounts with their bank
by a mortgage on their homesteads. Their wives signed the mort-
gages when presented to them by a notary, but later denied that
there ever was any formal acknowledgement of their signatures
to the notary. The court held that the certificate of an officer
having authority to take acknowledgements can not be impeached
by showing merely that the officer's duty was irregularly per-
formed. In Tichenor v. Yankey, 89 Ky., 508, the court would
not permit the defendant to show that the deed had not been vol-
untarily executed by her even where there was a mistake in the
description of the land so that the wrong piece of land was mort-
gaged. This is the acknowledged rule that the officer's certificate
will in the absence of fraud be conclusive in favor of those who in
good faith rely upon it. Bank v. Smith, 59 Neb., 9o. It must be
alleged and proved that some fraud has been practiced on the
married woman before the court will permit the acknowledge-
ment to be impeached. Jones on Mortgages, , sec. 538.
Perhaps the nearest direct decision affirming the principal case
to be found in the books is the case of Sullivan v. First National
Bank, 37 Tex. Civ. App., 228. In this case, a motion was made
for a continuance on account of defendant's sickness. An affidavit
was made signed with the defendant's name by his attorney. The
clerk's jurat to the affidavit showed on its face that defendant
had sworn to it and had authorized its signature over the
telephone. The court refused to consider the application on the
ground that it could not be properly sworn to over a telephone.
But the court very clearly sets forth the fact that the legislature
must have had in mind the formalities of an oath when they pre-
scribed the manner in which it should be taken. It says that
while the statute does not require that an affidavit to an applica-
tion be made by the party to the suit, it must be sworn to and
the necessary formalities of an oath must attend the administra-
tion of the oath. It is necessary to the validity of every oath or
affirmation, not alone that it shall be binding on the conscience of
the affiant, but that it be made under the pains and penalties of
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perjury. The law requires the affiant to be in the personal pres-
ence of the officer administering the oath, to the end that he be
certainly identified as the person who actually took the oath. The
legislature had in mind the meaning of the oath as well as its
history. In early times and in .other states certain forms and
formalities are observed-raising the right hand, laying the hand
on the Bible, the Pentateuch, or the Koran-all seeking to bind
the conscience of the affiant. These contemplated his presence
before the officer. The oath must be administered in a manner in
which the affiant could be made to answer to the pains and penal-
ties of perjury in the event that the oath should prove false. In
order that prosecutions for perjury may be sustained it is re-
quired to be established beyond a reasonable doubt that
an oath has been legally made, that the matter sworn to was false
in fact, and that the defendant in the prosecution is the one who
made the oath. The fact that the clerk recognized the affiant's
voice is not sufficient. The clerk must be able in the event of a
prosecution for perjury to identify the affiant as the one who
signed and swore to the affidavit and to be able to do this would
require the affiant's actual personal presence at the time of admin-
istering the oath.
The general law of the use of the telephone is set forth in
Central Union Telephone Co. v. Falley, Io Am. St. Rep. (Ind.),
114 and note. That the telephone by the necessities of commerce
and public use, has become a public servant, a factor in the
commerce of the nation and of a great portion of the civilized
world, can not be disputed. As telephones are used by all classes
of persons for business purposes, some legal effect must be given
to conversations held over them. Where both parties resort to
this method of communication, they must intend some legal effect
to follow. If they are not willing to assume the risks incident
to the mode, they should decline to resort to it or to permit others
to communicate to them in that manner. State v. Nebraska Tele-
phone Co., 17 Neb., 126. Telephone communications are usually
held to be admissible in evidence and even though the voice of the
party is not recognized it does not affect the admissibility, but
merely the weight of the evidence. People v. Ward, 3 N. Y.
Crim. Rep., 483, 511.
The courts of justice do not ignore the great improvements in
the means of intercommunication which the telephone has made.
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Its nature, operation and ordinary uses are facts of general scien-
tific knowledge, of which the courts will take judicial notice as
parts of public contemporary history. When a person places him-
self in connection with the telephone system through an instru-
ment in his office, he thereby invites communication, in relation to
his business through that channel. Wolfe v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.,
97 Mo., 473.
It would seem from the general recognition given by the
courts to the telephone as a commercial necessity and the conclu-
siveness of the officer's certificate of acknowledgement that an
acknowledgement and examination of a married woman as to
her execution of a deed, if taken over a telephone, could not be
impeached for that reason alone.
ESTOPPEL OF THE STATE TO PROSECUTE FOR A CRIME BY REASON OF
ITS OFFICERS HAVING ENTRAPPED THE ACCUSED
INTO ITS COMMISSION.
In the recent case of De Graff v. The State, io3 Pac. (Okla.),
538, the first of its kind since the adoption of the State Constitu-
tion, the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals decided that the
state may convict an offender of its liquor laws, even though all
of the testimony against him was obtained while offering induce-
ments to the defendant to break such law by a person in the em-
ployment of the prosecuting officer for that purpose only.
Evidence given by persons who have bought liquor for no
other purpose than to obtain evidence against the defendant upon
which to base a prosecution, has been given to juries with the
charge that they were to examine it with caution and if there was
any craft or indirect contrivance in procuring the testimony, they
were to examine it with the greatest care and caution. Common-
wealth v. Graves, 91 Mass., 114. Yet if the evidence was pro-
cured by the witness while acting to ferret out crime without
guilty intent, his testimony should need no corroboration and such
witness should have the same standing as any other. Wright v.
The State, 7 Tex. App., 574. The case of Saunders v. The
People, 38 Mich., 218, decided that it is proper to subject the
witness to close cross-examination, and though not directly in
point, it gives us by analogy some idea of what weight a great
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judge might give such testimony. In this case, Webb, a police
officer, upon being asked by the defendant to leave the court room
door unlocked, informed his superior of the request and together
they caught an accomplice of the defendant's who came through
the door and attempted to take some bonds. Judge Cooley, in
commenting upon the evidence given by the police officer, says:
"Webb was an important and necessary witness in the case, and
the conviction of the defendant must, so far as we can understand
from this record, have depended upon the belief of the jury in
his evidence to conversations had with the defendant. That evi-
dence was open to unfavorable inferences; and without saying
that such inferences should have been drawn, my brethren think
the record should have permitted very searching cross-examina-
tion under the circumstances. If he testified truly, he was appar-
ently conniving at and assisting in the crime charged; and though
he may have done this, as he says, not by way of enticing the
defendant into crime, but only by allowing him the opportunity
he sought and requested, yet it placed him in an equivocal posi-
tion, and the jury ought to have had the benefit of all the light
the former dealings of the parties would have thrown upon the
transaction. And although a question to the witness which im-
plied rascality to the defendant himself as well as the witness,
seems extraordinary, yet it may have tested the credibility of
the witness as well as any other, and his credibility in the case
was quite as much involved as the defendant's guilt."
To prohibit such testimony by a rule of evidence would, of
course, be destroying a valuable agency in the enforcement of
the liquor laws, yet a charge to the jury might in some cases
have that effect and before deciding to limit its effect the trial
judge should examine it with as much care and caution as he
directs the jury to use.
In Maine, the fact that incriminating evidence against a liquor
law offender was secured by a detective, was considered imma-
terial. State v. Rollins, 77 Me., 380. Nor does the fact that they
aid in committing the crime for the purpose of securing such evi-
dence make them accomplices. State v. Baden, 37 Minn., 212.
Against the majority holding, laid down in the principal case, a
directly opposite view has been taken by the Colorado Court of
Appeals which seems to be entirely of Colorado origin. In the
leading case of Ford v. The City of Denver, io Col. App., 500
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(1898), the defendant, a druggist, sold a prohibited quantity of
spirits without the protection of a license or a doctor's prescrip-
tion. In reversing the lower court, Thomson, P. J., says: "It
appears that the city was instrumental in procuring the sale of the
liquor. Its purpose was to lay the foundation for a suit. * * * *
The city is in no position to say that its ordinance was violated.
It was as much responsible for the sale of the liquor as the de-
fendant, and will not be permitted to replenish its treasury from
the penalties incurred at its instigation. It cannot be heard to
complain of an act the doing of which is solicited." In State v.
Braisted, 13 Col. App., 532, the defendant was fined upon doubt-
ful evidence procured by a woman who bought a quantity of
alcohol under the direction of the town attorney. In following
Ford v. The City of Denver, supra, the Court of Appeals said:
"So far as appears, the sole object the attorney had in view, was
to procure a violation of the ordinance in order that a prosecution
might be instituted against the offender and a penalty recovered
from him. * * * * It is entirely clear that the liquor, if it was pur-
chased at all, was not purchased for the private use of any person.
It was purchased to involve the seller in a violation of the ordi-
nance, in order that the town attorney might be able to pursue
him for a penalty. It was peculiarly the duty of the town attor-
ney, in view of the office which he held, to uphold the ordinances
of the town and to discountenance their violation. So far as we
can see, his motive was to compel the victim to pay his money into
the town treasury. It would be contrary to good morals to allow
the plan to succeed. Public policy will not permit a municipality
to derive profit from unlawful acts which are deliberately insti-
gated and contrived by its officers." Wilco.r v. People, 17 Col.
App., lo9.
The true rule in accordance with the weight of authority and
denied, it seems, only by the above Colorado cases, is adopted
by the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals in the principal case.
Here the defendant was indicted for violating a liquor law upon
evidence secured by a person who had drunk liquor sold him by
the defendant, which he bought with one dollar that the county
attorney had given him to use in seeing if anyone was violating
the law. The court in its opinion says: "We cannot agree with
the reasoning of the Colorado Court. It would be applicable to
that class of crimes in which the want of consent of the owner
of the property to its taking or destruction was a necessary ele-
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ment in the offense. The owner of the property taken might by
his conduct in employing a detective to entrap a person suspected
of crime, destroy the element of want of consent to such taking
and hence no crime would be committed."
An attempt to harmonize State v. Braisted, supra, with the case
in hand would be unsuccessful unless there is a difference in the
degree of guilt in the sale of liquor-contrary to law-to a per-
son who does not intend to use it (of which the seller will prob-
ably know nothing) -and a sale which is disposed of upon the spot.
That would be taking away part of the penal effect of a penal
statute. Under a liquor statute, the buyer is not guilty of a crime,
at least legally, but the statute means that whoever violates it shall
be held guilty under any circumstances. Comparing the cases far-
ther we find a direct conflict of opinion as to what is the better
public policy under the same circumstances. The Colorado decision
seems to go without the letter of the law and excuses a crime
which has been perpetrated upon the public by the defendant with
at least constructive intent. Surely it is impossible to say that
the public officer, by whom the purchase of liquor was proposed,
aided such intent. The act and intent are there. It is a crime and
legal acts of other persons, although morally questionable, are
unworthy of legal cognizance for the purpose of mitigating that
crime.
Crimes of this nature are difficult to detect and prove. If it
were inadmissible to introduce such evidence, a dealer engaged
in the illegal sale of liquor would rarely be apprehended and our
laws would be winked at. Instead of putting an offender in fear
of the law it would make him feel safe in violating it.
LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER FOR THE PERMISSIVE WRONGFUL USE OF
HIS PREMISES BY HIS EMPLOYEES TO THE INJURY OF THIRD
PERSONS.
In the case of Hogle v. Franklin Mfg. Co., New York Lau,
Journal, Vol. 44, No. 27, the defendant permitted its employees,
for a period covering several months, to throw bolts, nuts, and
other small pieces of iron from the windows of its factory, upon
the plaintiff's adjoining lot, during working hours. Plaintiff
secured and took several of the missiles thus thrown to the
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president of the defendant corporation and was assured that such
action as was necessary would be taken to stop this dangerous
practice. Plaintiff's lessor notified the general manager of the
defendant corporation many times of the existence and the con-
tinuance of these trespasses which were so frequent and of
such a nature as to become not only dangerous, but a nuisance
as well, and asked that he see that such acts be abated.
Through the wantonness and disregard or malice of the de-
fendant's employees, the plaintiff sustained a severe injury and
brought this action upon the grounds of negligence and nuisance.
The defendant corporation contended that there could be no re-
covery unless the jury should find, that these pieces of iron were
thrown upon the plaintiff's premises as a necessary consequence
of the work being carried on there, or as an incident to it, and
also argued that its workmen were not acting within the scope of
their employment while perpetrating these acts, and that therefore
an action for negligence would not lie.
The. lower court did not so hold in deciding the case and
rendered a judgment of negligence against the master, which was
later set aside by the trial justice on the ground, as above stated,
that the acts were not committed by the servant while in the scope
of his employment, or performing some act incident to it
It seems that this point of law-the scope of employment-has
been carried farther or construed more liberally than was orig-
inally intended. The courts are practically unanimous that the
employee must be doing some act, in or incident to the employ-
ment to render the master liable, but the circumstances are so
peculiar in this and parallel cases, that justice seems to be de-
feated, when the phrase, scope of employment, is permitted to
have any bearing whatsoever, in determining a verdict.
As this case logically should be determined upon-the use of
property-it is well for us to look at the general rule, which
holds, "That no one has absolute freedom in the use of his prop-
erty, but is restrained by the co-existence of equal rights in his
neighbors to the use of their property, so that each in exercising
his rights must do no act which causes injury to the other."
Booth v. Rome, 14o N. Y., 267.
There is an ancient maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,
which is the foundation of this well established rule, that no one
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may make an unreasonable use of his own premises to the material
injury of his neighbor, and if he does, the latter has a right of
action, provided the enjoyment of life and property is materially
lessened. Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y., 568.
The master in this case, with a right to direct and control his
servants and their methods of accomplishing his work, permitted
them to continue in and about his premises, after having received
notice; that wilful and malicious acts had and were being com-
mitted under color of his employment, and Dinsmoor v. Wolber,
85 Ill. App., 152, holds, that the master is liable for all injuries
suffered by third parties through reason of such wrongful use of
his property, whether such acts committed are wilful or only
careless. "Wilful" is held to mean, "Such a gross want of care
and regard for the rights of others as to imply a disregard of
consequences of an injury inflicted." Cleveland C. C. & St. L.
R. R. Co. v. Cline, iii Ill. App., 416. "Careless" is defined as, "A
failure to exercise such care as the circumstances require." Nor-
folk Beet Sugar Co. v. Preuner, 55 Neb., 656.
In deciding this case the court said, that had the action been
brought on the single issue of nuisance it would have been suffi-
cient in determining that the use made of the property constituted
a nuisance that, in this case, the property was to the master's
knowledge, being used as a means whereby dangerous trespasses
were being habitually committed, to the extent of inflicting sub-
stantial injuries, and would therefore be such a use as would be
held a nuisance. The defendant may be liable as trespassor,
although negligence is not established. Sullivan v. Dunham, x6i
N. Y., 290.
In examining whether or not this constituted a reasonable use
of property, we find that if the act committed is of such a nature
that injury may be inflicted upon person or property, it may be-
come a nuisance as a matter of fact, but when the acts are such
that the injury to person or property is the only natural conse-
quence, it should be held a nuisance as a matter of law. Melker
v. City of New York, i9o N. Y., 481.
In the case under discussion the master had received many
notifications of the use to which his property was being put and
COMMENTS 503
was well aware of the dangerous practice that was being carried
on, and when he did not employ the diligence necessary and owing
to the public to see that the windows were closed or to detect the
guilty parties and dismiss them from his service, such disregard
would be sufficient to imply a ratification of the acts of his em-
ployees. Cobb Simon, I19 Wis., 597. The court said that the
retention of a servant in the employ of the master after notice
to the principal of a tort committed by the servant, is evidence
of the ratification of the act by the principal, but the information
to the principal must, as it was in this case, be full and complete.
In his decision of this question, there can be no doubt that the
trial judge erred in setting aside the verdict upon the ground,
that as the acts of the defendant's workmen were not done within
the scope of their employment, an action for negligence would
not lie. The acts were sufficient, as found by the jury to exist,
to charge the master with the negligent conduct of his business,
or to. have based the finding upon the wrongful use he permitted
to be made of his property, which resulted in the maintenance of
a nuisance, and as such the judgement of the Court of Appeals
in so finding should be approved.
COMPULSORY CONSTRUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL SIDETRACKS.
The question of shipper's constitutional right to demand of a
common carrier the construction of a spur track to his place of
business has been variously treated in this country. Some of
the states have provided for this matter by the enactment of
statutes, others by making it subject to regulation by commissions,
and one state has gone so far as to devote to it a section of its
constitution. Where the legislatures have been silent the courts
have, of necessity, laid down the law, and they, too, have dis-
agreed. A recent decision bearing on this point is to be found
in the case of the Nothern Pacific Ry. Co. vs R. R. Commission,
in io8 Pac. (Wash.), 938.
In this -case a shipper, operating a sawmill at a point about
midway between two recognized stopping places and at some
distance from the main line of the railroad, petitioned the Rail-
road Commission to issue an order requiring the construction of
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a spur. The Commission found the facts as stated and issued
the order. This appeal was prosecuted from a judgment of the
lower court affirming the order of the Commission and resulted
in a reversal of that judgment by the Supreme Court. That court
upheld the contention of the railroad company that such an order
was the taking of private property without due process of law,
and that it contravened the fourteenth amendment of the
Federal Constitution. The Commission based its order on the
theory that it was promotive of public good and within the re-
cognized police power of the State.
The legislature of North Carolina touched upon this subject
when, in the statute which created its Corporation Commission,
the power was conferred on that body, "To require the construc-
tion of sidetracks by any railroad company to industries already
established, or to be established, provided it is shown that the pro-
portion of such revenue accruing to such sidetrack is sufficient
within five years to pay the expenses of its construction."
Since industrial sidetracks are contributing elements in the
development of interstate commerce it might well be expected
that Congress would have given them some attention. The
Hepburn Law of 19o6, 34 Statutes at Large, 585, in extending
the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission, makes this
provision: "Any common carrier, subject to the provisions of
this act, upon application of any lateral, branch line of railroad,
or of any shipper tendering interstate traffic for transportation,
shall construct, maintain and operate upon reasonable terms a
switch connection with any such lateral, branch line of railroad,
or private sidetrack which may be constructed to connect with
its railroad where such connection is reasonably practicable and
can be put in with safety and will furnish sufficient business to
justify the construction and maintenance of the same." It is
significant that both these legislative enactments are careful to
provide compensation for the railroad should it be required to
construct a sidetrack. Failure on the part of petitioners for side-
tracks to assure the railroads an indemnity for the construction
and maintenance of such sidetracks has been the chief cause of
the courts' refusing to order the railroads to comply with these
demands.
The two Nebraska cases, Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. vs. Nebraska
and Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. vs. Farmers' Elevator Co., both re-
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ported in 217 U. S., 196, which were cited in the principal case,
and upon which the court based its opinion, were decided favor-
ably to the petitioners in the state court, but-were reversed by the
United States Supreme Court. That court held that a statute
which declared that a railroad, without any preliminary hearing,
must construct a sidetrack at the demand of a shipper, was not
to be justified as an exercise of the police power, but that com-
pliance with such statute would be regarded as the taking of
private property without due process of law, even if construed
as operating only when demand for such facilities was reasonable.
The legislative acts mentioned above comply with the demands
of the United States Supreme Court in that they require an in-
demnity. Futhermore "the due process of law" requirement is
satisfied, for a judicial hearing is absolutely necessary to deter-
mine the sufficiency of the indemnity.
Although the federal legislature had been silent on this subject
until i9o6, Illinois regarded it as of such importance that when
a new constitution was adopted in i87o a section was devoted to
it. It reads in part as follows: "All railroad companies shall
permit connections to be made with their track, so that any such
consignee, and any public warehouse, coal bunk, coal yard, may
be reached by the cars on the said railroad.
By what means are railroads to be forced to comply with the
demands of shippers that spur tracks be constructed? in Illinois, it
has been held that after a shipper has petitioned the Railroad Com-
mission and the railroad continues its refusal to construct, manda-
nius will lie. Likewise in Illinois mandamus lies under statutory
provision. State vs. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Omaha
R. R., i9 Neb., 476; Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Suffern,
i29 Ill., 274. Where the railroad itself wishes to acquire proper-
ty for the construction of new lines the power of eminent domain
is exercised. The all-embracing police power was the authority
used by the Commission in the principal case in its attempt to
compel the railroad to grant the petitioner's request. The de-
mands of the courts that must be complied with are opposed to
certain characteristics of the exercise of the police power. When
the police power is exercised and property taken the owner is not
compensated because such taking is regarded as damnum absque
injuria and because in theory the owner is sufficiently benefited
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by sharing in the general good that results. The police power is
exercised only for the purpose of promoting the public welfare.
The object must be regulation and not the raising of revenue.
This power is usually exerted merely to regulate the use and en-
joyment of property by the owner, or if he be deprived of the
property outright it is not taken for public use, but rather de-
stroyed in order to promote the public welfare. If the courts
insist that the railroads be compensated whenever they are com-
pelled to construct a sidetrack it would seem that the compelling
force could not be regarded as an exercise of the police power.
However the courts do not always insist that the indemnity be
made. For example in the case of Ry. Co. vs. Florida, 42
Florida, 358, a law which required intersecting railroads to con-
struct such switches, sidetracks and connections as would permit
the transfer of cars from one road to the other was held to be
a reasonable exercise of the police power.
The proper exercise of the police power is for the protection
of safety, order and morals. That this power is often extended
to include public-convenience is well known, though Freund in
his work on "The Police Power" questions the propriety of
calling a regulation for public convenience an exercise of the
police power. But in Escanaba Co. vs. Chicago, 107 IIl., 678,
the court said: "But the states have full power to regulate within
their limits matters of internal police, including in that general
designation whatever will promote comfort, convenience and
prosperity of their people."
The fifth article of the amendment of the Federal Constitution
reads in part as follows: "Nor shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation." Most of the state
constitutions have limitations upon the power of the state to
condemn private property except for public use. However many
of the constitutions leave in the state just such powers as it had
without limitation.
Thus it may be said that the decision in the principal case is
essentially in agreement with the weight of authority. Railroads
are not, in the absence of constitutional and statutory provision,
required to construct industrial sidetracks. Further, the use of
such sidetrack must be a public one. In most states the deter-
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mination of the public nature of the use is left to the legislature.
Section I6 of Article i of the constitution of Washington pro-
vides that such determination shall be made by a court. Colorado
and Missouri have similar constitutional provisions. The courts
are not prone to regard a use of property a public one merely
because it is clothed with a public interest as in the case of those
industries which develop the natural resources of a state and are
therefore said to aid in the development of the state and the
prosperity of the people. The sidetrack may be for a private
use, and compensation must be made to the railroad: and the
power under which a state may require a railroad to construct
such a side track is more of an exercise of the power of eminent
domain than of the police power.
